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Abstract 
Local governments in China in the 1990s relied increasingly on self-earned 
income, but little is known about the impact of this on the provision of 
public goods, especially in wealthy urban areas. This paper shows how 
departments charged with providing welfare and social services to the poor 
have been supplementing budgetary expenditures with other, self-earned, 
finance. Based on research in the city of Tianjin, it argues that although 
self-earned income can increase spending on welfare and social services, 
increasing reliance on such income, and variation in departmental 
capacities to generate it, exacerbate already inequitable welfare provision 
even within this wealthy city. It also creates conflicts of interest and 
problems for local government spending controls. 
 
Introduction  
Since the early 1990s there has been a growing appreciation of the extent to which local 
governments in China have in the post-Mao period used non-budgetary income to finance 
government work and administration.1 Studies of China’s fiscal system have noted the 
increase in local government ‘extrabudgetary’ and ‘self-raised’ funds2, and several accounts 
of local government work show the growing importance of income derived from non-
budgetary sources, including businesses of various kinds.3 While acknowledging that self-
earned income does provide much-needed finance for local governments4, studies have noted 
the problems it creates by focussing government attention on revenue generation to the 
detriment of official tasks5, and providing opportunities for corruption.6 However, just as 
significant is the impact on public goods provision. Park, Rozelle, Wong and Ren have argued 
that because in a context of fiscal decentralisation and increasing self-reliance there is little or 
no redistribution of self-earned income, reliance on it is likely to exacerbate existing 
inequalities in government revenues and expenditures.7 West and Wong have shown in their 
comparative study of in Shandong and Guizhou how reliance on self-earned income has 
amplified disparities in spending on education and health services not only between poorer 
and richer provinces, but within provinces, between urban and rural sectors, between large 
and small cities, and across rural counties and townships.8  
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This paper examines the generation of self-earned income by district and sub-district level 
departments charged with the provision of welfare and related social services in the wealthy 
coastal city of Tianjin, and assesses its effects on provision.9 It differs from earlier studies 
in its study of the impact of self-reliance on social welfare but also in its focus on one of 
the richest cities in China, and in its intra-city comparison of district governments. The 
paper is organised as follows. First, it shows why ‘civil affairs’ departments10, the main 
government providers of welfare, began trying to increase their self-earned income from the 
1980s as government spending on civil affairs declined as a share of total spending.11 It then 
examines the ways in which these departments have generated their own income and its 
impact on the provision of welfare. I argue first that the quest for income in the civil affairs 
system is due to budgetary underfunding that led the Ministry of Civil Affairs to openly 
encourage those activities in the early 1990s. Second, because budgetary investment in civil 
affairs work is decentralised to local levels, it varies at those levels, dependant largely on the 
state of the local economy. Since the local economy is an important influence on district and 
sub-district level departments’ capacities to earn their own income, inequalities in self-earned 
income can exacerbate existing inequalities in budgetary welfare spending across even a 
wealthy city like Tianjin. At a time of growing inequality and poverty among urban residents, 
such inequalities in welfare spending are cause for great concern.12  
 
This account uses documentary sources to show the budgetary problems of civil affairs 
departments and their increasing reliance on self-earned income nationally since the mid-
1980s, and central government policy. Since, as I will discuss below, data on self-earned 
income are difficult to obtain and unreliable, I use interviews with officials in civil affairs 
departments, district governments and neighbourhood offices, and local social scientists in the 
northern coastal city of Tianjin between 1993 and 1999 to show the effects of reliance on that 
income. Although systematically comparable figures for self-earned income and the funding 
of welfare and social services across the sub-municipal districts were not available in Tianjin, 
the interviews did produce a clear picture of the growing disparities in welfare and social 
services funding and provision. 
 
The Budgetary Underfunding of Welfare and Social Services 
The provision of welfare and social services in China has been handled since 1949 (and 
indeed before) by ‘civil affairs’ departments.13 Currently, there is a Ministry of Civil Affairs 
(MCA) within the central government, and below it a hierarchy of civil affairs bureaux 
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(CABs) at provincial, city, county, town and urban district levels, and civil affairs sections 
within rural township governments and urban neighbourhood offices (see Figure 1).14 In 
China, the ‘social welfare’ (shehui fuli) provided by civil affairs departments has since the 
1950s comprised material social relief (shehui jiuji), social services (shehui fuwu) and social 
preferential treatment (shehui youfu), all of which were eligible to only a narrow segment of 
the population.15 Social relief referred to material assistance for those with no work, no source 
of income and no family, usually elderly or disabled people and orphans, though it was also 
extended to small numbers of families in extreme poverty.16 This has been extended in the 
1990s, with the creation of ‘minimum living security’ (zuidi shenghuo baozhang, MLS) in 
cities across China, for those whose income falls beneath a certain basic level.17 Social 
services were provided to the same group of people, and include residential care, home help, 
and the provision of leisure and other facilities, such as local health clinics. Social preferential 
treatment was, and still is, given to dependants of military servicemen, disabled army veterans 
and their dependants, and the dependants of revolutionary heroes. The narrow scope of 
welfare provisions by civil affairs departments was partly due to the fact that they were 
provided within a context of almost guaranteed employment and a system in which most of 
the urban working population and their dependants were provided with social insurance and 
other benefits through their work places. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Since the mid-1980s, when the urban reforms began, social change, particularly growing 
income inequalities and the dismantling of the work unit system, has increased the need for 
welfare and social services, and the scope of civil affairs departments’ work has widened.18 
Although there has been a focus on rural poverty alleviation and on improving support for ex-
servicemen and their families (the latter driven by policies to modernise the army), other 
welfare and social services initiatives, even relatively well-publicised ones such as 
‘community services’, have received little investment.19 Civil affairs departments are widely 
recognised to be underfunded and ‘poor’.20 Indeed, despite the introduction of MLS, which in 
principle substantially extended eligibility for social relief payments, budgetary spending on 
civil affairs nationally has declined since the early 1980s as a proportion of total government 
budgetary spending (see Table 1). The average annual share was 1.62% between 1980 and 
1984, 1.54% between 1985 and 1989, 1.51% between 1990 and 1994, and 1.49% between 
1995 and 1999.21 Moreover, inflation has reduced spending in real terms. In 1995, 
government spending on civil affairs work was at 87.2 per cent of the 1990 figure at constant 
prices.22 Reports from across the country reinforce the picture of underfunding and shortages 
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of local government finance for civil affairs work at every level23, and the damage this has 
done to the provision of welfare and social services24, particularly material social relief.25  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Supplementing Budgets with Self-earned Income 
In response to their growing financial problems, the MCA and civil affairs departments at all 
levels of the system made repeated pleas for more budgetary investment, particularly in the 
early to mid-1990s.26 At the same time, the MCA openly encouraged civil affairs departments 
to find income from alternative, non-budgetary, sources.27 Although these departments had 
long had ‘welfare enterprises’, which provided employment for people with disabilities while 
at the same time generating extrabudgetary funds28, in the late 1980s and 1990s these 
struggled to compete in the market economy.29 The first concession in the face of budgetary 
shortages came in 1987 when an exception was made to the prohibition on gambling so that 
civil affairs bureaux could run lotteries to raise money for spending on welfare, especially 
provisions for people with disabilities, orphans, and community services.30 From 1987 to 1995 
lottery ticket sales earned 4.18 billion yuan nationally, of which 2.64 billion yuan had been 
spent on welfare projects by mid-199631, the equivalent of almost 5 per cent of civil affairs 
spending over the same period.  
 
From 1992, under the rubric of developing ‘tertiary industry’32, the MCA began to encourage a 
wider variety of methods for generating EBF, or self-earned income.33 Most of the suggestions 
for raising income applied to state or local government-run welfare institutions such as homes 
for the elderly and disabled, and orphanages, which were encouraged to charge fees to some of 
their residents or ‘customers’, and turn them into businesses.34 However, the MCA also 
suggested that civil affairs departments themselves get involved in various new revenue-
generating projects, for example by setting up real estate businesses or finance companies to 
handle ‘welfare capital’ such as rural old age pensions and mutual funds. Even the Ministry 
itself set up a ‘civil affairs welfare real estate development company’ and created development 
zones to develop ‘civil affairs economy’ and train people in business management for poor 
areas.35 In November 1993, the MCA also encouraged community service centres run by civil 
affairs departments to provide social services to ‘broaden their scope of service and business ... 
and transform themselves into economic entities’, charge fees for services and seek foreign 
investment.36 
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Self-Earned Revenues in the Civil Affairs System: the Local Experience 
Civil affairs departments and institutions that handle welfare provision have heeded the MCA’s 
call to seek alternative sources of finance and supplement state budgetary allocations and 
longstanding forms of extrabudgetary funds (EBF). They have developed the so-called ‘civil 
affairs economy’ through lotteries, soliciting donations for the charitable funds they managed, 
setting up street markets and new businesses, and helping their welfare enterprises and non-
profit making institutions set up businesses.37 They also have derived income from fees for 
official tasks such as registering marriages and social organisations.38 
 
Lotteries were particularly popular. As one Tianjin district civil affairs bureau chief noted, 
because they need little capital investment, involve little risk, and produce quick profits, 
lotteries can be one of the best means of generating income.39 Indeed, for some CABs, 
lotteries can earn large sums of money and have become an important source of revenue.40 
For example, in one Tianjin district, two recent lottery rounds had earned a total of four 
million yuan. Of this, the district CAB kept 800,000 yuan, or one fifth of the takings, the 
equivalent of more than half of its annual budgetary expenditures.41 The income was used for 
a variety of purposes, including to build or renovate welfare homes, homes for the elderly, 
health and community services centres and welfare enterprises, social relief, helping people 
with disabilities, and the provision of larger facilities for which budgetary finance was 
inadequate.42 
 
Civil affairs departments have also used other methods to raise income.43 For some, soliciting 
donations is, like the lotteries, an easy means of doing this44, and the poverty relief and other 
funds that donations are paid into, as well as pension funds under their control, are often 
invested to generate further capital.45 In one place, around 50,000 yuan of the proceeds from this 
kind of reinvestment had been used for ‘welfare services’, to set up welfare enterprises and a 
‘people’s welfare trade company’, and to help three welfare institutions to develop sideline 
industrial production.46 Of course, there are also many reports in China of officials pocketing 
such funds for themselves or losing funds due to poor investment decisions.47 
 
In addition to exploiting income under their control, many departments have begun businesses 
related to the various spheres of civil affairs work.48 For example, because they are charged with 
managing marriage registrations, they set up companies to provide extra wedding services. One 
CAB chief noted that weddings, like funerals and lotteries, were good sources of income 
because they fell within the sphere of civil affairs work and so other departments could not 
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compete.49 Though perhaps less lucrative than some businesses, such activities have 
nevertheless earned useful sums: one department had made 30,000 yuan (about US$3,750) from 
this work between 1993 and early 1995.50 
 
Civil affairs departments have also been setting up businesses unrelated to their administrative 
work.51 The range of such ventures is extremely varied, from factories and commercial 
ventures to dance halls to hostels.52 Some departments set up ‘civil affairs commercial 
zones’53, and have invested in developing street markets, shops, and leisure facilities.54 In one 
poor county, the civil affairs department had invested all it could afford in developing a mine 
and a pig farm, and was planning to raise sheep, cows and rabbits to earn income.55 While 
some of these businesses may employ disabled workers and be classified as welfare 
enterprises, many are referred to as ‘tertiary enterprises’, a term which usually means they are 
purely profit-seeking sideline businesses.  
 
Neighbourhood Offices and Self-earned Income 
Neighbourhood offices (NOs) are sub-district government agencies staffed by cadres and in 
receipt of district budgetary allocations (see Figure 1). An urban district in a large city like 
Tianjin might contain 15-20 neighbourhood offices, each with a population of 50-80,000 
people. Each neighbourhood office contains sections that are subordinate to bureaux within its 
district government.56 These offices are the lowest tier of urban state administration, and it is 
necessary to understand their situation to gain a full picture of civil affairs work because their 
civil affairs sections carry out much of the actual delivery of urban welfare and social 
services.57 These sections distribute social relief on behalf of district civil affairs bureaux, 
arrange and direct the provision of community services58, organise volunteers, and co-ordinate 
social services. They are often well placed to do this because they are also the departments 
charged with handling residents’ committees, the ‘self-governing mass organisations’ that 
actually do much of the community social work. Neighbourhood offices now also provide 
some of the homes for the elderly and health and recreational facilities for the elderly and 
disabled. Partly because of the focus on community services and mutual self-help, much of 
which they handle, and because of increasing poverty, inequality and other social problems, 
the civil affairs work that neighbourhood offices do has increased in the reform period.59 
 
Fieldwork in Tianjin also shows that its NOs were underfunded in the 1990s.60 Their 
budgetary allocations declined until they became insufficient not only for their administrative 
running costs, but even for staff salaries.61 The shortfalls affected their ability to do their 
work, including welfare work.62 Moreover, NOs which often, like civil affairs bureaux, earn 
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EBF from welfare enterprises, have seen a decline in this source of income and in that from 
their other collective enterprises, which also often struggle to compete in emergent markets.63 
Documentary information on neighbourhood office finance is not published in China, but 
interviews in Tianjin revealed that NOs, like CABs, frequently supplement their budgetary 
allocations with their own self-earned income.64 They have used similar methods to the CABs 
to earn income for salaries and running costs, and to fund their work, including welfare and 
social services.65 In addition to existing revenues from long-standing sources of EBF, such as 
welfare and other collective enterprises66, NOs are generating new income from local street 
markets and service sector businesses, including housing and real estate development, trade 
companies67, and, like CABs, from donations and fees.68 One Chinese civil affairs journal 
reported that in the civil affairs section of one neighbourhood office in Tianjin had set up a 
‘civil affairs’ street market that both raised funds for the civil affairs departments and 
provided employment for unemployed and disabled people in the neighbourhood.69 In 
addition, NOs also take a share of income raised by the residents’ committees within their 
area, sometimes even requiring residents’ committees to generate income.70 The residents’ 
committees do this by charging fees for community services, running small shops and small-
scale businesses and sometimes even gambling halls.71 Such income has been used to provide 
welfare facilities such as homes for the elderly, nurseries for children, and to build community 
services centres and supplement material relief for the needy.72 
 
Outcomes of Reliance on Self-earned Income 
Differential Earning Capacity and Local Economies 
Official figures indicate that the amounts of extrabudgetary income CABs and NOs are able 
generate for themselves can vary significantly between provinces.73 Similarly, fieldwork in 
Tianjin indicates that there are differences across urban districts and sub-district 
neighbourhood offices in ability of CABs and NOs to generate non-budgetary income.74 But 
what explains these differences? West and Wong have argued with relation to self-earned 
income for education and health services in rural areas, that such differences are often linked 
to the performance of the local economy and the presence or absence of rural township and 
village enterprises (xiangzhen qiye).75  
 
In Tianjin, officials similarly linked the earning capacity of civil affairs departments and 
neighbourhood offices primarily to the nature of the local economy. Of course, other factors 
can be influential. For example, lottery success can be dependent on the presence or absence 
of competing lotteries or on good advertising76, and both lottery and business success may 
also be linked to the initiative and abilities of officials in these departments and their 
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willingness to pursue such activities. However, according to the officials themselves, a 
significant factor determining earning capacity is the economic environment at even the 
highly localised district and sub-district level: civil affairs departments in districts and 
neighbourhood offices in the city centre, where property has higher value and there are more 
commercial opportunities, are better placed than those in poor, residential areas to earn 
income from a range of activities, from lotteries and charitable donations to business.77 
 
Because information on self-earned income is closely guarded by officials against higher 
levels of government who might want to top-slice it, there is no reliable data to correlate 
amount of self-earned income with proximity to a good business environment.78 However, 
interviews in a number of neighbourhood offices across the city revealed stark contrasts in 
earning capacity that neighbourhood officials themselves and other observers linked to 
location.79 The differences can be particularly sharp in relation to lotteries. In the 1990s, civil 
affairs bureaux in Tianjin’s central urban districts, where there are more shoppers and tourists, 
held lotteries regularly, sometimes weekly, while those in outlying suburban districts had to 
limit themselves to one or two per year because they could not sell tickets if they held more.80 
Since, as noted above, the amounts of money earned from lotteries could be very large—one 
district civil affairs bureau in Tianjin had earned the equivalent of half its annual budgetary 
income in one round—this could substantially transform the total finance available to district 
civil affairs departments.81 
 
The differences in income from business activities can also be significant and are influenced 
by the same economic factors. For example, a neighbourhood office in a central, commercial 
district had two welfare enterprises, thirty factories, restaurants and karaoke bars, and three 
street markets, which altogether earned over ten million yuan per year in profits and taxes, 
making this the fifth most economically successful neighbourhood in the city.82 Indeed such 
was the earning capacity of neighbourhoods offices right across this particular district, that 
none now received any budgetary investment from the district government and were entirely 
self-reliant.83 In contrast, a neighbourhood office in a poor, residential district had few 
revenue-generating opportunities. According to its officials it had no service sector businesses 
because they were not viable in such a depressed part of town. It was unable even to make 
money from street markets (though in some parts of the city, markets can earn 80,000 to 
100,000 yuan per year).84 Officials in this neighbourhood office were therefore reliant on its 
failing old collective enterprises and on renting out their office space. Though they had 
generated some limited income from renovating slum housing there was little capital for new 
welfare facilities and social services. The neighbourhood could not afford a much-needed 
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renovation and expansion of its small home for the elderly, had no community services centre, 
and was obliged to use volunteers and charge fees for many of the services it provided, a 
practice its leading official criticised as inappropriate.85 
 
The Exacerbation of Existing Inequalities 
Differences in urban district and sub-district civil affairs department capacities to generate 
extra-budgetary revenue exacerbate rather than compensate for differences in budgetary 
revenues and expenditures. Civil affairs budgetary spending is decentralised throughout the 
system, with less than one per cent financed by the central government.86 Thus, there are 
inequalities not only between provinces, but within them. Just as provincial level figures on 
civil affairs budgetary spending show poorer provinces such as Yunnan and Inner Mongolia 
lagging behind richer ones like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong87, so there are differences 
at sub-provincial and sub-municipal levels. In urban districts, budgetary revenues (like those 
of rural counties and townships) are a share of locally-collected taxes88, and here too, 
redistribution of such revenues is limited so that districts with higher revenues have higher 
budgetary expenditures.89 Perhaps because cities are relatively small in terms of area, with 
dense populations and integrated transport systems, it is expected that there will be greater  
centralisation and redistribution within them. However, the self-reliance of districts, many of 
which have populations as large as 450-700,000 is still substantial. Since a large proportion of 
government revenue is derived from business taxes, business districts such as Heping district 
in the centre of Tianjin tend to have the highest revenues, and as a result sometimes almost 
twice the per capita expenditures of the poorest districts (see Table 2).90  
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Thus, those district governments with the highest budgetary revenues are precisely those 
whose departments have the best opportunities for generating self-earned income.91 Although 
figures on district level civil affairs expenditure are rarely published, CABs in wealthier 
districts in Tianjin do receive significantly greater budgetary allocations from their respective 
district finance departments.92 For example, one wealthy district bureau reported that it 
received all the funding that it needed in the form of district budgetary allocations (around 
1.2-1.4 million yuan per year) and had just built a large community services centre. Contrast 
this with a middle-income district bureau, which reported that budgetary allocations were 
insufficient for capital investment in new facilities.93 Meanwhile, some poor districts, like 
Hebei, where traditional local industry was in decline, were unable to pay even the full 
budgetary allocations due to their administrative departments, so that finding investment for 
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regular civil affairs work, let alone new facilities, was difficult.94 
 
To compound these inequalities, lower levels of budgetary funding and fewer opportunities to 
generate income are increasingly likely to be in sub-municipal districts where poverty is 
greatest and more people are in need of welfare.95 As housing markets emerge and income 
inequalities grow, poorer residents are moving out of the wealthier central urban district of 
Heping and into the cheaper housing in outlying districts with fewer resources to spend on 
welfare.96 Since access to most civil affairs welfare and social services are (unlike health 
services) based on residence within the administrative jurisdiction of a particular district and 
neighbourhood office, people cannot obtain them in other parts of the city where provision is 
better. Social researchers in Tianjin reported that poor people preferred to live in central 
Heping district because social relief, including extra material relief above the stipulated 
provisions, and other facilities were better than elsewhere in the city.97  
 
However, three factors may reduce the extent to which self-earned revenues exacerbate 
existing inequalities in district wealth and welfare financing. First, departments which 
successfully earn their own income often receive little or no budgetary finance. For example, 
in Tianjin in the mid- to late 1990s, all the neighbourhood offices in wealthy central Heping 
district were financially independent and received none of their income from the district. In 
poorer districts, meanwhile, governments seemed to finance where they could: between 1992 
and 1994 the fiscal situation had been extremely tight in one Tianjin middle-income district 
and so four of its NOs had received only 20 per cent of their salaries. However after 1994, 
when fiscal revenues increased because of the tax reforms that year, the district raised its 
budgetary allocation and paid 50 per cent of the wage bill. But one poorer district was simply 
unable to maintain budgetary allocations, and budgetary finance to one of its NOs had 
steadily declined as a proportion of that NO’s spending from 90 per cent in 1992 to 50 per 
cent in 1993 and 30 per cent in 1996. Even though it had relatively few opportunities to earn 
income from other sources, this NO had been forced to rely on its own self-generated income 
to make up the difference.98 Thus, while reductions in government budgetary funding to high 
income generating departments can offset some inequalities, given the capacities of some 
departments to generate revenue and the severe budgetary shortages of others, significant 
differences may remain. 
 
Second, inequalities may also be offset by municipal government redistribution among the 
districts and NOs through earmarked grants.99 For example, in Tianjin the municipal 
government had allocated 250,000 yuan for spending on community services work, and civil 
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affairs departments were invited to apply for a share of this. Similarly, some of the city’s 
lottery income has been redistributed to the districts and NOs to set up welfare enterprises.100 
However, such grants are often awarded only when there are matching funds for a project, so 
that this redistributive mechanism still discriminates against the poorest departments.101 
Moreover, these extra ad hoc funds are unlikely to provide adequate compensation for 
consistent underfunding of civil affairs work and salaries. Certainly, provincial level reports 
argue that differential budgetary investment at lower levels has a detrimental impact on basic 
civil affairs work.102  
 
Third, not all the self-earned income of CABs and NOs is spent on welfare. Particularly 
where salaries are not being met from local government coffers, self-earned income seems to 
be used first to pay these (and the pensions of former officials, often a considerable amount). 
Documentary accounts from across the country indicate that self-earned income is also used 
for general running costs103, to renovate buildings and offices, provide housing for staff, and 
buy computers,104 as well as to supplement welfare provision. Indeed large amounts are 
sometimes spent on improving the working environment of the civil affairs departments 
themselves. For example one county bureau in Zhejiang had invested 1.6 million yuan earned 
from its economic activities in renovating its offices and fitting them out with computers and 
new furniture, and 1.5 million yuan in building a dormitory building for its staff and 
supplying them with pagers.105 Income is also often reinvested in enterprises, in establishing 
new street markets or in developing business or other revenue-generating capacities.106 For 
example, of the one million yuan that one neighbourhood office in Tianjin had earned, only a 
few thousand was given to community service work and most of the rest was ploughed back 
into business ventures.107 Although officials in one neighbourhood claimed that ‘some of the 
NO’s income from its enterprises is used for services to residents, and to solve their 
problems’108, departments seem most commonly to use their funds to provide welfare 
facilities that require one-off injections of capital, such as the construction of community 
services centres and old people’s homes.109 However, wealthy districts in both Tianjin and 
Shanghai were also reported to spend more on social relief, including one-off payments to the 
poor for example at Spring Festival, and regular social relief payments to those just above the 
poverty line and so not eligible for standard MLS payments.110  
 
Conclusions: Self-earned Income, Welfare Delivery and Urban Inequality 
Studies of government finance in China have noted the growth of extrabudgetary and self-
raised finance. This paper shows self-earned finance to now be a significant source of revenue 
among many civil affairs departments and neighbourhood offices in part because the MCA 
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openly encouraged revenue-seeking activities in the early 1990s as budgetary investment 
declined. Self-earned income clearly provides injections of finance that pay salaries and 
improve the working environment of civil affairs officials and also supplement spending on 
capital projects for welfare facilities and social relief payments to the poor. Assuming an 
inability to shift more budgetary investment over to welfare, it may also allow some 
improvements in welfare provision that would not otherwise have been possible.111 (Though it 
may of course give local governments an excuse for not increasing budgetary allocations.) 
Where departments are able to generate their own revenues, homes, centres and facilities for 
disabled people are being built with the proceeds. In the debate over these activities that has 
taken place in the civil affairs system’s journals, some CAB chiefs have therefore argued that 
developing civil affairs economy has produced positive results.112  
 
However, while reliance on self-earned income is improving the situation for some, it is a 
poor substitute for adequate and well-planned budgetary investment because of the problems 
it creates. First, it threatens to undermine the administration of service delivery. As other 
studies have noted, the economic activities of government departments raise questions about 
the proper limits of government work.113 Indeed, some CAB officials have themselves argued 
the principle that civil affairs departments are a part of the government and therefore should not 
be engage in economic activities114, while others have condemned those activities for leading 
officials to focus their efforts on revenue-generating projects to the detriment of their core 
tasks.115 Moreover, reliance on self-earned income weakens state controls over government 
finance and hence the co-ordination and planning of its work. Although the new revenues 
have sometimes involved a legitimate expansion of the EBF category to include income from 
lotteries, new ‘tertiary’ businesses, and rent on office space, many new revenues are better 
termed ‘extra-system finance’ because they fall outside the conventional budgetary and 
extrabudgetary categories and are less well-monitored.116 It can therefore be especially 
difficult to prevent misuse of such finance.117 Although new measures were introduced in an 
attempt to gain control from 1995118, a Tianjin official noted later that decade that still no-one 
now knew how much money CABs at each level had, how much they needed, and how much 
they were really spending. Meanwhile ‘civil affairs economy’, particularly lotteries and 
tertiary industry in community services work, continued to be promoted in the late 1990s.119  
 
A less obvious problem with increasing reliance on self-earned income is its contribution to 
inequalities in public services provision. Studies of the fiscal system have argued that reliance 
on self-earned income can exacerbate inequalities in public services such as education and 
health between provinces, between urban and rural areas, and across rural areas.120 This paper 
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shows the same problems to be present in relation to the provision of civil affairs welfare and 
social services. It also shows there to be significant differences across urban districts in the 
city of Tianjin. Even in this wealthy coastal city significant differences in the self-earned 
income of CABs and NOs can intensify differences between districts in the quantity and 
quality of welfare and social services provision. Aggregate municipal figures on the economy 
and government spending hide the fact that here, too, fiscal decentralisation limits 
redistribution of budgetary resources and an urban district government’s spending is tied to its 
economy. Disparities between urban districts in budgetary revenues and expenditures are then 
magnified by reliance on income earned from other sources by district and sub-district 
governments because the same factors that contribute to high budgetary revenues also affect 
ability to generate self-earned income. Despite the conspicuous consumption of central urban 
districts and higher average per capita incomes, there is growing inequality within urban 
populations. Without more intra-city redistribution that takes into account self-earned as well 
as budgetary finance, and particularly if there is a trend toward the concentration of poor 
people in self-reliant poor districts, welfare provisions may be least adequate where they are 
most needed. 
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Figure 1: The Civil Affairs Administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key 
  Hierarchical control 
  Part of 
 
*Districts and neighbourhood offices are urban administrative units, county and townships are rural administrative 
units. 
 
Table 1: Civil Affairs Spending as a Share of Total Government Spending in China, 
1980-1999 (%) 
Year Share of 
spending 
Year Share of 
spending 
1980 1.44 1990 1.54 
1981 1.72 1991 1.67 
1982 1.70 1992 1.42 
1983 1.69 1993 1.40 
1984 1.59 1994 1.50 
1985 1.64 1995 1.52 
1986 1.51 1996 1.53 
1987 1.49 1997 1.44 
1988 1.50 1998 1.50 
1989 1.57 1999 1.48 
 
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, Statistical Yearbook of Civil Affairs 2000, p.303. 
 
Ministry of 
Civil Affairs 
City or Province Civil 
Affairs Bureau 
City or Provincial 
Government 
*District or County 
Civil Affairs Bureau 
Central Government 
(State Council) 
*District/County 
government 
*Neighbourhood or 
Township Civil Affairs 
Section or Bureau 
*Neighbourhood Office/ 
Township government  
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Table 2: Tianjin Urban District Government Average Per Capita Revenues and 
Expenditures, 1995 & 1999 (yuan) 
 
 
District 1995 1999 
 
Revs Exps Revs Exps 
Heping 479 478 850 992 
Nankai 175 256 257 478 
Hedong 162 277 294 462 
Hexi 164 261 299 455 
Hebei 172 295 292 438 
Hongqiao 128 249 211 424 
 
Source: Tianjin Statistical Bureau, Tianjin Statistical Yearbook, 1996, 2000. 
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